RB-ANALYSIS-003: Identify Patient Zero

Document Control

1. Prerequisites

• Log Access
  • EDR telemetry access
  • Authentication logs access (IdP, SSO, Active Directory, Entra ID, Okta, etc.)
  • Active Directory / directory service logs access
  • Email gateway / mail flow telemetry access
  • VPN logs access
  • Cloud audit logs access (e.g. AWS CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs)
  • SaaS application logs access (e.g. Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, Salesforce, GitHub, Okta)
  • Network / proxy / DNS / firewall logs
• SIEM timeline data
• Endpoint timeline data (file, process, registry, autorun events)
• SIEM platform access
• EDR platform access
• Asset and user directory data (to correlate hostnames, accounts, and owners)

2. Step-by-Step Instructions

1. Build Initial Timeline

   • Identify the earliest confirmed indicator of compromise (alert, user report, log anomaly, externally reported indicator)
   • Identify the first suspicious execution, action, or transaction observed
   • Flag first suspicious authentication event
   • Anchor the timeline to a known-good reference point prior to the first suspicious event

2. Identify Earliest Impacted Host, Account, or Entity

   • Use known IOCs (hashes, IPs, domains, accounts, signatures) from step 1 as search terms to pivot into alerts and telemetry
   • Check whether alerts fired (EDR, SIEM, IDS, DLP, cloud security tooling):
     • If alerts exist - identify the earliest across all entity types (host, account, cloud tenant, SaaS app, mailbox, repository, API key/token); treat it as a starting point, not a conclusion
     • If no alerts fired - pivot to raw telemetry using known IOCs: review auth logs for first unusual login; access logs for first unusual resource access; DNS/proxy logs for first suspicious outbound connection; cloud/SaaS audit logs for first unusual API call, permission grant, or data export; EDR telemetry for first suspicious execution or persistence artefact
   • Note: earliest alert ≠ earliest activity - always look back further in raw telemetry to confirm nothing pre-dates it
   • Document user reports
   • Record the earliest confirmed timestamp of suspicious activity and the entity it is associated with

3. Review Initial Access Indicators

   • Check for phishing activity
   • Investigate VPN compromise indicators
   • Assess exposed remote-access services (RDP, SSH, VPN, jump hosts, management interfaces)
   • Review credential theft indicators
   • Identify malicious payload delivery (drive-by, download, attachment, supply chain, third-party software)
   • Check for vulnerability exploitation (recently disclosed CVEs, web app exploitation, public-facing service abuse)
   • Check for valid-account abuse (purchased credentials, leaked tokens, OAuth consent abuse, session hijack)
   • Check for trusted-relationship abuse (third party, contractor, managed service provider, supply chain)
   • Check for physical / insider vectors (lost device, USB, insider misuse) where applicable

4. Analyse User Activity

   • Review privileged account usage
   • Identify unusual login locations, devices, or impossible travel
   • Document non-human identity activity (service accounts, machine identities, API keys, OAuth apps)
   • Flag MFA, conditional access, and session anomalies (prompt bombing, token theft, consent grants)
   • Identify activity from accounts that are dormant, recently created, or recently re-enabled

5. Identify How Lateral Movement Occurred

   • Determine lateral movement techniques
   • Track shared credential usage
   • Identify administrative tooling, RMM, and dual-use tooling abused for movement
   • Document remote execution methods
   • Identify identity-driven propagation (token reuse, federation abuse, role assumption, cross-tenant access)
   • Identify cloud / SaaS propagation (cross-account, cross-tenant, app-to-app)
   • Determine how the compromise spread from the initial entity to others

6. Validate the Candidate Patient Zero

   • Confirm no earlier indicator exists for that host, identity, or entity
   • Confirm the initial access vector is consistent with the proposed timeline
   • Confirm the spread from the identified patient zero is consistent with observed compromise across other entities
   • If any of the above fail, the candidate is not patient zero - return to 1.

3. Post-Action

• Record timeline and initial access vector in the incident ticket
• Document all newly identified compromised accounts, hosts, and entities discovered during the investigation
• Record any new IOCs (hashes, IPs, domains, accounts, tokens, signatures) in the incident ticket

Contributor

Vishal Thakur GitHub: https://github.com/malienist

Jayden Vo GitHub: https://github.com/jayden-vo

Contributed to the Arcana Incident Response Documentation Framework.